A successful communication strategy requires a central bank to be credible. And this, in turn, means matching words with deeds.
of the Central Bank of Chile's intended message, we consulted with people who participated in monetary policy meetings and asked them to classify the signals into simple categories, so as to construct a consensus c-bias, which is the final object of our analysis. Market agents might interpret the c-bias differently than the Board of the Central Bank of Chile. In this paper, however, we are concerned with the Central Bank's own consistency in matching words and deeds, which is why we focus on the Central Bank's own interpretation of the c-bias. 2 An evaluation of the Bank's consistency can be easily accommodated in a predictive ability framework because the consensus c-bias is nothing but a forecast of the future direction of the MPR.
How accurate should the c-bias be to support the hypothesis that the Central Bank of Chile is indeed matching words and deeds? In principle, there is no natural accuracy threshold above which we could confidently draw a conclusion in favor of the credibility of the c-bias. Furthermore, in an uncertain economic environment, a hundred percent accuracy is not even expected for the best possible forecasting device. Without any absolute threshold against which to compare the c-bias, we rely on a number of relative thresholds coming from several alternative forecasting strategies. The lack of a more accurate alternative forecasting strategy is consistent with a credible c-bias. In contrast, if the c-bias were systematically outperformed by alternative forecasting methods, one could hardly argue in favor of consistency between words and deeds, as relying on the c-bias would lead to systematic mistakes that could be avoided by using other forecasting approaches.
In this context, we focus on evaluating the informal null hypothesis that the c-bias is a sufficient indicator of the Board's decisions regarding the future direction of the MPR. We test this informal null hypothesis by making use of formal out-of-sample tests of predictive ability. Our basic framework considers the c-bias a natural forecast for the future direction of the MPR, but with no specific forecasting horizon. When the Board releases a c-bias, there is no indication about the timing of the decisions that are supposed to be made in the future, if conditions do not deviate far from the baseline scenario. Therefore, we explore up to twelve months to see if the Board has fulfilled its intentions as expressed in the c-bias. This point is important for the interpretation of our results. When analyzing twelve forecasting horizons, we could easily be confronted with mixed evidence: the alternative benchmark could outperform the c-bias at some horizons but not others. Fortunately, we face this situation only once: the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) outperforms the c-bias when predicting one month ahead, whereas the c-bias is the clear winner at longer horizons. We interpret this as evidence supporting our informal null hypothesis. 3 We compare the c-bias's predictive ability with several benchmarks. First, we take a random walk (in levels and first differences) and a uniformly distributed random variable, considering three equally likely scenarios: a tightening, easing, or neutral c-bias. We also consider the case of a Taylor rule model including predictors such as the output gap, inflation deviation from the target, and the persistence of the MPR. Survey-based forecasts, as mentioned, are also included in our analysis. Finally, we make use of market expectations derived from the forward rate curve.
According to our terminology, our results indicate that we cannot reject the informal null hypothesis of the c-bias being a sufficient indicator of the future direction of the MPR. In other words, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the Central Bank of Chile matched words and deeds in the sample period. This is so because no other benchmark outperforms the c-bias's predictive ability at forecasting horizons longer than one month.
Beyond our empirical results, our work contributes to the literature in several different directions. First, we assemble a database for a qualitative variable that is, to our knowledge, novel among emerging economies. Second, we contribute to the literature that evaluates central banks' performance under inflation targeting. This literature focuses on evaluating several dimensions of central banks' performance through macroeconomic final outcomes onlynot through time-consistency in matching words and deeds, which would be key to establishing a credible policy framework. 4 This last feature, although in this arena. The growing attention to inflation-targeting countries, which have taken huge steps toward increasing transparency and accountability, has only made the topic even more appealing, because inflation-targeting countries usually complement the adoption of this regime with several publications and press releases.
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The empirical analysis of communicational tools on macroeconomic outcomes is mainly focused on its impact on interest rates and the yield curve. 9 For the United States, Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson attempt precisely to separate the effects of current MPR changes from the effects of announcements and statements by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve. 10 They label these effects current policy and the future path policy. Using a principal-components approach, they conclude that previous studies focusing only on the current MPR change missed most of the story, as the second factor (future policy) accounts for more than three-quarters of the total effect on longer interest rates. Following similar insights, Andersson, Dillén, and Sellin examine a wide set of monetary policy signals, including the publication of inflation reports and executive speeches from the Riksbank.
11 They conclude that current monetary policy actions have their greatest effect on the short end of the yield curve and that signaling appears to have some effects on longer interest rates. Siklos and Bohl examine whether communication is important for explaining interest rate movements by the Bundesbank, using a Taylor rule equation.
12 They find that the communication variable they construct is robust and significant. This communication variable is based on the number of speeches on a particular matter for which an auxiliary equation is estimated. This last equation, however, has on its left-hand side the number of speeches and on the right-hand side current and past values of interest rate changes. Thus, their empirical work might not be quantifying the impact of communication on future interest rates, but rather could be capturing the impact of past policy changes on current policy.
Two papers are more closely related to the present article in the sense that they focus on the predictive ability of communicational tools on future monetary policy changes. Lapp and Pearce study the (in-sample) predictive ability of the bias in the FOMC. 13 They conclude that the bias has some power to predict future changes in the Federal funds rate. They show that a bias toward tightening implies, on average, a positive change in the Federal funds rate of 11 basis points, in contrast to a negative change of 37 basis points after an easing bias. Rosa and Verga analyze the recent experience of the European Central Bank using the introductory statements of its president in his monthly press conference. 14 They map wording into an index using the frequency of words associated with the tightness of monetary policy. They show that this index is positively and significantly correlated to subsequent repo rate changes. They also find that the European Central Bank's rhetoric is a complement to, rather than a substitute for, measures of activity and exchange rate movements within an empirical reaction function. They fail to show, however, that the European Central Bank's rhetoric can be a better predictor than Euribor rates. Finally, they regress the change in Euribor rates on the change in onemonth forward rates and the first difference of the communication index, both of which are positively related with the dependent variable.
Communicational Bias in Chile
The Board of the Central Bank of Chile makes monetary policy decisions at its monthly monetary policy meetings. In these meetings, which are announced six months in advance, the Board sets the level of the MPR, which is the target rate based on which liquidity is provided to the financial industry. 15 This operational implementation is supported by extensive communication by the Central Bank with the public. In particular, policy decisions are communicated immediately after monetary policy meetings in an official news release or minutes.
These minutes can be broken down into three sections: first, the policy decision is announced; second, the arguments behind the decision are sketched, in terms of domestic and international economic events; and, finally, the last paragraph of the minutes is devoted to providing hints about the "most likely course of future monetary policy" if conditions do not deviate far from the baseline scenario. It is this last signal that we call the communicational bias. The Central Bank of Chile has published these statements since September 1997, but it is only since 2000 that the publications have been issued every month without interruption. Moreover, in August 2001, the Central Bank changed its target instrument from an inflation-indexed MPR to a nominal interest rate. 16 We therefore decided to work with monthly data from August 2001 to March 2009, which is long enough to capture at least one whole cycle of monetary policy decisions. Figure 1 plots the evolution of the monetary policy rate in Chile during this period. As the figure shows, this variable has been quite persistent.
As mentioned earlier, an unambiguous c-bias can be extracted from several minutes, but the reading of the signal could be subject to researchers' misinterpretation. To avoid a mistaken perception of the Central Bank of Chile's intended message, we asked the people who participated in the monetary policy meetings (with or without voting rights) to classify the signals into the following categories: strong upward bias, moderate upward bias, no change, moderate downward bias, strong downward bias, and no bias.
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16. This change implied a large decline in interest rate volatilities; see Fuentes and others (2003) . 
F I G U R E 1 . The Monetary Policy Rate in Chile
In 63 percent of the cases, the people with whom we consulted reported the same opinions on the signal. Only one statement is classified into three different categories, and the rest of the cases have two categories. For these cases, we asked the opinion of other staff economists at the Central Bank and thus reached a consensus on the message every statement provides. Because some of our categories have very few observations, we collapse them into the following three categories: upward bias (including the previous strong and moderate upward bias categories), neutrality (including the previous no change and no bias categories), and downward bias (including the previous strong and moderate downward bias categories). Figure 2 displays this variable, which we call the consensus c-bias. When we collapsed the observations into three categories, the percentage of coincident opinions rose sharply to 89 percent, indicating that most of the initial disagreement stems from different appreciations of the intensity of the c-bias. This strategy also allows us to work with a less ambiguous, and thus higher quality, forecast.
Several stylized facts arise naturally. First, a neutral bias is the most frequent state (50 percent of the time), followed closely by a tightening bias (38 percent). An easing bias, in contrast, only occurs 12 percent of the time. 
F I G U R E 2 . Communicational Bias a
Second, the c-bias is highly persistent, with only twenty-one changes over the course of ninety-two months. Third, the last third of the sample differs from the first two in terms of persistence. In the first two-thirds, the average maintenance time is five months, and the longest period of an unchanged c-bias is twenty-four months. In the last third of the sample, the average and longest maintenance periods are only three and five months, respectively. Fourth, the c-bias is not very hard to predict. In fact, it is straightforward to build a forecast of the future direction of the MPR from the Survey of Professional Forecasters in Chile. Because this survey is released several days before the monetary policy meetings take place, this forecast could also be used to predict the c-bias. How good of a predictor is it? The success rate in predicting the c-bias is 85 percent, both when the prediction is evaluated with the c-bias as a whole and when only a nonneutral c-bias is used. This high degree of predictability in the c-bias is not surprising and, furthermore, is consistent with authors who favor a predictable monetary policy. 17 Because this paper evaluates consistency between words and deeds, the key exercise should aim at detecting how well the c-bias predicts the future MPR. The results reported later in the paper show that the c-bias is a really tough benchmark to beat in this task.
When not neutral, the c-bias is a natural predictor of future changes in the direction of the MPR. When neutral, however, the c-bias cannot be interpreted as a forecast of some future policy decision. In the forty-six months in which the c-bias is neutral, only once was the original category no change. The rest of the time, the neutral label means that the c-bias was absent and no forecast was released. Not considering this point would probably lead to unfair conclusions, as we would be wrongly interpreting the absence of c-bias as a signal of future MPR movements. Consequently, we test the predictive ability of the c-bias only when this variable is not neutral. We do this following Giacomini and White's conditional predictive ability framework. 18 Finally, the consensus c-bias is not a real-time variable. As mentioned earlier, we constructed this variable using the retrospective interpretation of people who participated in monetary policy meetings. Therefore, our forecasting evaluation is not an out-of-sample exercise, but rather a pseudo-outof-sample exercise.
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Pablo Pincheira and Mauricio Calani 1 1 1 17. See, for instance, Blattner and others (2008) . 18. Giacomini and White (2006) . A neutral c-bias may mean something and may have an impact on macroeconomic outcomes. In our analysis we are only saying that most of the time a neutral c-bias is not an intended forecast of future MPR movements.
19. We thank Barbara Rossi and Claudio Soto for highlighting this point.
Methodology
As mentioned earlier, if the c-bias is informative about future developments of the MPR, then it should have an impact on economic outcomes. This impact may be subtle and hard to identify using econometrics in small samples. Nevertheless, a strong relationship between the future MPR and the c-bias is a necessary condition for this impact to exist.
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Our empirical exercise entails two particular econometric challenges. First, most of the time series we deal with in this paper show high degrees of persistence. One may think that a similar pattern of persistence between the c-bias and the MPR may be driving the econometric results reported later in the paper, but we show that the c-bias's rate of success in predicting the MPR is similar in periods of high and low persistence. We also consider persistent benchmarks when comparing the predictive ability of the c-bias, including martingale models and a Taylor curve with an explicit term introducing persistence. If persistence were the only reason explaining that the c-bias is a good predictor of the MPR, then it would not outperform another benchmark displaying similar patterns of persistence. Our results show that the c-bias is, in general, better than any other benchmark.
Our econometric framework for analyzing predictive ability is designed to work with autocorrelated data. In particular, we construct our test statistics using heteroskedasticity-and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) variance estimators.
The second econometric challenge concerns the discrete nature of both the c-bias and MPR changes. Jansen and de Haan are, to our knowledge, the first to take into consideration the discrete characteristic of the data, but they do not perform formal predictive ability tests and rely solely on the goodness of fit (pseudo-R-squared) of their estimations. 21 In this paper, we explicitly consider the discrete nature of the data and use the formal out-of-sample predictive ability test proposed by Giacomini and White to test for equal predictive ability between the c-bias and several benchmarks.
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Before presenting our results, we briefly summarize the intuition behind this test.
The Giacomini-White Conditional Approach
We consider two competing parametric forecasting models for the conditional expectation of a scalar time series, Y t+1 . 23 We denote the forecasts from these two models as y where β t1 and β t 2 denote parameter estimates of β 1 and β 2 with information up until time t. The implementation of the conditional approach relies on the fact that equation (2) is equivalent to for all F t -measurable functions h t .
One-Step-Ahead Conditional Test
When the forecasting horizon is τ = 1, h t ΔL R,t+τ is a martingale difference sequence if the null hypothesis is true. Giacomini and White propose the following statistic for the test of equal conditional predictive ability:
where P n denotes the total number of forecasts, T + 1 is the total number of available observations, R denotes the maximum size of the rolling estimation window, and
Giacomini and White provide conditions under which the asymptotic distri-
When the dimension of the testing function h t is one, the test is asymptotically normal.
Multi-Step Conditional Test
When the forecasting horizon is τ > 1, Giacomini and White propose the following statistic for the test of equal conditional predictive ability: 27 where and Ω P n is a HAC estimate of the variance of P Z n P R n , .
Z h R t t R t , ,
,
Giacomini and White provide conditions under which the asymptotic distribution of T h P n , R,τ ΗH 0 is chi-square: 28 Again, when the dimension of the testing function h t is one, the test is asymptotically normal.
We test conditional predictive ability using a very simple testing function, h t , and thus evaluate the predictive ability of the c-bias only when this signal represents a forecast.
Interpretation of the Test in Our Environment
The c-bias alone is a predictor of the direction of change in the MPR, but it does not provide a specific horizon. We assume that behind this c-bias there is a latent predictor of the future MPR, which we call b t (k) and define as follows:
We consider a generic loss function, 28. Giacomini and White (2006) .
where y t p (k) is a predictor of Y t+k , which uses information available up to time t. This loss function can often be expressed in terms of an increasing function of the difference between the predictor and the variable it attempts to predict:
Even though the most commonly used loss function is quadratic, it is also common to use a loss function based on the direction of change, such as where In particular,
The expected value of this loss function is then which is nothing but the probability of the predictor b t (k) missing the direction of change of the variable Y t+k , which is the same as the probability that the c-bias will provide a wrong prediction of the future change in the MPR. Let C denote the event in which {c-bias t ≠ neutral} and let
Then, Therefore,
This expression shows that the expected value of the loss function difference times the testing function, h t , is proportional to the difference in the failure rate in predicting the direction of change of the future MPR, conditioned on the Board actually communicating a forecast. Most of our analysis uses this econometric framework, comparing the failure rates of two competing predictors.
The next two subsections explicitly demonstrate that the null hypothesis of the Giacomini-White approach translates into very simple conditions for two leading cases among our benchmarks. 29 We analyze the special case of the uniform distribution and the case of a martingale difference model for monthly changes in the MPR.
The Special Case of the Uniform Distribution
One of the benchmarks we use to compare the predictive ability of the c-bias is a pure luck model, which measures the Board's assessment against a lucky guess. To this end, we consider a model in which statements about the future stance of monetary policy are generated independently by a random number generator. This random device associates equal probabilities (of one-third) with the possible future outcomes: tightening, easing, and 
The proof of this proposition is presented in appendix B.
The Special Case of the Martingale Difference Model for Changes in the MPR
We also explore the predictive ability of the c-bias with respect to another simple benchmark: namely, a martingale difference model for monthly changes in the MPR. We consider the following model:
With this model, we have
We therefore have the following predictor for MPRs at time t + k:
The next section reports the results of our horse race between the c-bias and all the benchmarks we are considering. Figure 3 shows the c-bias's success rate in predicting future changes in the MPR. Gray bars indicate the unconditional success rate, including episodes in which the c-bias is neutral; black bars show the success rate conditional on the Central Bank of Chile issuing a signal (nonneutral c-bias). Because the c-bias is a forecast with no specific forecasting horizon, we explore predictability up to twelve months ahead, a horizon that should be long enough to capture the policy-relevant predictability of the c-bias. The black bars in panel A of the figure indicate that the conditional success rate peaks at more than 80 percent in the fourth month. 30 This success rate is slightly lower at longer horizons. Panel B shows even more interesting results, as it depicts the success rate of the c-bias calculated only in periods in which the c-bias changed. In the figure, the conditional success rate is, on average, just a little lower than the average in panel A, indicating that the behavior of the c-bias as a predictor of the future direction of the MPR is similar in periods of inertia and innovation. In fact, the average success rate during the first six months is 75 percent in panel A and 74 percent in panel B. When averaged over the twelve horizons, the success rate is 77 percent in panel A and 73 percent in panel B.
Empirical Results
These high rates suggest that the c-bias is a strong signal of the Central Bank's future deeds. Nevertheless, this simple analysis does not indicate whether this predictability is easy or hard to achieve. To clarify this point, we compare the c-bias as a predictor of the future direction of the MPR against different models. We use the Giacomini-White framework outlined in the previous section and focus on the testing function defined in expression (5).
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The C-Bias and Very Simple Benchmarks
We start by considering a simple model assuming that the MPR follows a martingale difference process. The core statistic, presented in the second column of table 1, is proportional to the difference in the failure rate in predicting the direction of future MPR changes, conditional on the Board actually
30. The gray bars roughly show a decreasing success rate as the forecasting horizon lengthens. We do not pay much attention to these results because they are obtained assuming that a neutral c-bias is predicting no change in the MPR, which is not correct because most of the time (98 percent) a neutral c-bias corresponds to no signal whatsoever.
31. Giacomini and White (2006) . t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6 t + 7 t + 8 t + 9 t + 10 t + 11 t + 12 a. Gray bars indicate the unconditional success rate, including episodes in which the c-bias is neutral. Black bars show the success rate conditional on the Central Bank of Chile issuing a signal (nonneutral c-bias).
F I G U R E 3 . The Conditional Success Rate of the Communicational Bias
a communicating a forecast. The third and fourth columns provide information about the standard errors and the corresponding t statistics. The fifth column shows p values for a one-sided test of equal predictive ability against the alternative of the c-bias having a better forecasting performance. A positive core statistic means that the loss function associated with the martingale is greater than that associated with the c-bias. In other words, a positive core statistic indicates that the c-bias is a better predictor than the martingale model. As the table shows, this is the case for all forecasting horizons. Furthermore, results are statistically significant in favor of the c-bias for every horizon except the first one, which is only marginally significant at the usual significance levels.
A martingale difference model for the MPR essentially predicts that the MPR will not change in the future. An alternative basic benchmark is a random experiment that imputes equal probabilities (of one-third) to the three possible future outcomes. The results of this comparison indicate that the c-bias does contain statistically significant information to predict the future MPR at every single horizon (see table 2 ).
Finally, we explore the predictive ability of the c-bias with respect to a martingale difference model for monthly changes in MPR. Table 3 shows our results when using the testing function (5). The c-bias outperforms this benchmark at all horizons except the first one. At the first forecasting horizon, however, the two methods are statistically indistinguishable. (Newey and West, 1987, 1994) . The t statistics are from the Giacomini-White (GW) test and the p value is from a one-tailed test.
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b. Positive values imply that the martingale is less accurate. (Newey and West, 1987, 1994) . The t statistics are from the Giacomini-White (GW) test and the p value is from a one-tailed test.
T A B L E 2 . Predictive Ability Test for the C-Bias against a Random Generator
b. Positive values imply that the random generator is less accurate. (Newey and West, 1987, 1994) . The t statistics are from the Giacomini-White (GW) test and the p value is from a one-tailed test.
T A B L E 3 . Predictive Ability Test for the C-Bias against a Martingale Model for the Difference in the MPR
b. Positive values imply that benchmark model is less accurate.
Ordered Response Taylor Rule Model
The c-bias predicts the direction of future changes of the MPR, but it could be proxying macroeconomic variables that are commonly followed by central banks. We therefore conducted a much more acid test for the c-bias's predictive ability, in which the benchmark is a discrete linear model inspired in a standard Taylor rule. We impose this structure based on the assumption that future policy rates will change in discrete multiples of 25 basis points, as has been usual in the past. Let Δr t+k,t represent possible MPR changes in the period from t to t + k, and let k be the forecasting horizon. During k periods, the MPR can change in any direction and in several magnitudes. Let J(k, t) be the number of possibilities of change in the MPR, which depend on both k and t. For example, in the four-year period from July 2003 to June 2007, with k = 2, Δr t+k,t took six values (namely, −1.00 percent, −0.50 percent, −0.25 percent, 0.00, 0.25 percent, 0.50 percent), and thus J = 6. As the forecast horizon lengthens, the number of possibilities of change rises, as do its extreme values. We use an ordered probit model to generate our forecasts using information on inflation and output. Ordered response models for Δr t+k,t can be derived from a latent variable model. Let Δr* t+k,t be a latent variable, where β is m × 1 and X t does not contain a constant. Let μ 1 < μ 2 < μ J be threshold parameters and define (for our example)
We can thus easily define the (conditional) probability distribution function for Δr h , given that Δr h can take a limited set of values: 
Δr e e t k t t t k t k
We can estimate the parameters μ and β through maximum likelihood (ML) and use these ML estimates for β to compute fitted values for Δr* t+k,t . Similarly, we can use the ML estimates for μ to infer a discrete response of Δr t+k,t .
F U N C T I O N A L F O R M S .
We assume the standard Taylor rule:   32 where π -is the target inflation rate, π t is current inflation (that is, the change in the log consumer price index over the previous twelve months), i t is the annualized policy rate (MPR), and (y t − y t p ) is the output gap, which we abbreviate as y t G . Adding persistence to the process creates a better description of the data.
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If we take a persistence-augmented version of equation (8) for period t + h and then subtract equation (8), we obtain
This expression clearly depends on unrealized data (t + h > t + h − 1 > t).
Because we need an expression that links i t+h − i t to available data at time t, we iterate the first term in equation (9), assuming that inflation and the output gap can be approximated by autoregressive processes, to find an expression in which i t+h − i t depends only on data available at time t:
Next, we assume that we can, for instance, approximate (π t+1 − π t−h+1 ) by a first-order autoregressive, or AR(1), process. Then, We can do the same with the change in the output gap in period h:
Iterating on these results, we obtain where ξ t+1,t+h is a function of the shocks ε t+1 , . . . , ε t+h ; ν t+1 , . . . , ν t+h ; and ω t+1 , . . . , ω t+h . We use this final expression in equation (6) as the model governing the latent variable in the determination of the discrete response Taylor rule.
P R E D I C T I V E A B I L I T Y T E S T S .
We use the model in equations (6) and (12) to generate threshold parameters, μ i . We then fit the model with actual data and save the corresponding discrete forecasts as in equation (7). The estimation procedure uses the first observations in the sample. We take a rolling estimation window of forty observations and compute one-to twelve-month-ahead forecasts to build pseudo-out-of-sample forecast errors. In this experiment, we are not using the vintages of the output gap, but rather are working with revised data, which is an additional source of noise that distinguishes our exercise from a real-time experiment.
There is a clear trade-off between estimation accuracy and the number of observations we use for prediction. We consider forty observations to be appropriate for estimation purposes. Figure 4 shows how the forecasts of the discrete Taylor rule look. Unlike the simpler martingale benchmarks, this model is able to predict both positive and negative future values of ΔMPR.
Finally, we compare the predictive ability of the c-bias and our Taylor rule. Results are displayed in table 4. Positive values of the core statistic indicate that the Taylor rule is, on average, less accurate in predicting the direction of the MPR change than the c-bias. With the exception of a few horizons in which no statistically significant evidence is found, our statistic is indeed positive, and we can confidently reject the null hypothesis in favor of the c-bias for horizons of two, ten, and eleven months ahead. The results are also marginally significant in favor of the c-bias in the last horizon. As in the other cases analyzed thus far, the c-bias is not outperformed at any single horizon. (Newey and West, 1987, 1994) . The t statistics are from the GiacominiWhite (GW) test.
b. Positive values imply the c-bias is more accurate than the Taylor rule model.
The C-Bias and the Survey of Professional Forecasters
The 
The C-Bias and the Forward Rate
In this subsection, we compare the c-bias's predictive ability to that of the forward rate. 34 As shown in table 6, our results indicate that for episodes in (Newey and West, 1987, 1994) . The t statistics are from the GiacominiWhite (GW) test and the p value is a from one-tailed test.
T A B L E 5 . Predictive Ability Test for the C-Bias against the Survey of Professional Forecasters
b. Positive values imply the c-bias is more accurate than the alternative benchmark.
which the c-bias is not neutral, the forward rate and the c-bias have statistically equal predictive ability. 35 This result means that, on average, the c-bias and the forward rate are equally accurate in predicting future changes in the MPR. Nevertheless, the information in the c-bias could still be useful for improving the predictive ability of the forward rate. We assess this possibility next.
If the forward rate curve is the best predictor of the MPR under quadratic loss, based on available information at time t, then its forecast errors should be orthogonal to information available at the moment of prediction. If orthogonality does not hold, then we could improve the predictive ability of the forward rate by using these nonorthogonal variables. In particular, if the c-bias (when not neutral) contains valuable information that can minimize the prediction error of the forward rate, then the following conditional expectation should be different from zero: (Newey and West, 1987, 1994) . The t statistics are from the Giacomini-White (GW) test and the p value is from a one-tailed test.
represents the forward-curve-based forecasting error at time t + k and f t (k) corresponds to the monetary policy rate forecast at time t + k coming from the forward curve. Equation (13) 
Evidence of statistically significant coefficients β 1 (k) and β −1 (k) would thus indicate rejection of the null hypothesis, and consequently that the c-bias provides useful information for financial agents to predict the MPR. Figure 5 shows our estimates of β 1 (k) and β −1 (k), together with their respective 90 percent HAC-confidence interval for one-sided tests. Under the null hypothesis of forecast errors being random, we expect β 1 (k) = β −1 (k) = 0. Nevertheless, we find that a tightening c-bias is associated with underprediction of the forward rate for the first four consecutive months. That is, a positive c-bias indicates that the forward rate should adjust upward to recenter the mean of e(t + h) on zero. In terms of the beta coefficients, we find that β 1 (1), β 1 (2), and β 1 (3) are statistically different from zero, indicating that the c-bias contains information that could be useful for improving forecasts from the forward curve. The results are similar when the c-bias signals an easing in monetary policy, in that a downward c-bias is associated with overprediction of the forward rate for the first six consecutive months. However, the size of the revision suggested by our analysis is much bigger than in the case of tightening. In terms of the beta coefficients, we find that β −1 (1), β −1 (2), β −1 (3),β −1 (4), and β −1 (5) are statistically different from zero, suggesting that the c-bias contains information that could be useful for improving forecasts from the forward curve.
We check for robustness of these results by augmenting expression (15), first with the actual change in the MPR and then with the actual change in the MPR and one lag. 36 We do this because evidence of statistically significant coefficients might be the result of the omission of the actual change in the MPR, and this variable could be the real driver of our previous results. We run two additional augmented regressions. Figure 6 reports robust estimates of the coefficients using a Bayesian model averaging (BMA) strategy following Brock and Durlauf. 37 We still find some statistically significant coefficients, but the evidence is weaker than before. Now a tightening c-bias is associated with statistically significant underprediction of the forward rate only for the first month. Similarly, an easing c-bias is associated with statistically significant overprediction of the forward rate only for the second and third months. In spite of this reduction in the number of statistically significant coefficients, our robust strategy indicates that the c-bias seems to contain valuable information for improving the predictive ability of the short end of the forward curve. Results from the first augmented regression show statistically significant coefficients only when the c-bias signals an easing in monetary policy. In this case, β −1 (2) and β −1 (3) are statistically different from zero. In the second augmented regression, we also find that β 1 (1) is statistically significant at the 10 percent significance level.
37. Brock and Durlauf (2001) . 38. Appendix C provides a detailed description of the BMA strategy.
public to complement their decisions on interest rate setting. We examine one particular feature of the communicational practice of the Central Bank of Chile contained in the press releases published immediately after monetary policy meetings: namely, the Board's assessment of the most likely future of monetary policy, which we call communicational-bias or simply c-bias.
To evaluate the Central Bank of Chile's own consistency in matching words and deeds, we examine whether the communicational bias translates into future monetary policy rate decisions. This analysis can be easily accommodated in a predictive ability framework, because the c-bias is nothing but a forecast of the future direction of the MPR.
In this context, we focus on evaluating the informal null hypothesis of the c-bias being a sufficient indicator of the Board's decisions regarding the future direction of the MPR. We test this informal null hypothesis by making use of formal out-of-sample tests of predictive ability. Our basic framework considers the c-bias to be a natural forecast for the future direction of the MPR, We therefore give the Board up to twelve months to match its intentions as expressed in the c-bias. Based on our results and terminology, we cannot reject the informal null hypothesis that the c-bias is a sufficient indicator of the future direction of the MPR. In other words, the evidence is consistent with a central bank that has matched words and deeds in the sample period. This is so because no other benchmark outperforms the c-bias's predictive ability at forecasting horizons longer than one month.
In particular, we find that the c-bias's conditional success rate in predicting the future direction of the MPR peaks at higher than 80 percent, irrespective of whether the calculation is made over the whole sample or using a subsample displaying lower persistence. We also show that the c-bias more accurately predicts future MPR changes than a martingale model in levels and differences. Similarly, the c-bias strongly outperforms random forecasts generated by a uniformly distributed random variable. Moreover, the pseudo-out-of-sample predictive ability of a more sophisticated model that considers inflation and output can be outperformed by the c-bias at some forecasting horizons. The Survey of Professional Forecasters provides a more competitive benchmark. This survey outperforms the c-bias at the first forecasting horizon, but it never outperforms the c-bias at longer horizons. On the contrary, the c-bias takes the lead when forecasting five to twelve months ahead. Finally, the c-bias is equally accurate as the forward rate curve. Nevertheless, we show that the predictive accuracy of the forward curve could be improved through the use of information from the c-bias.
This evidence is consistent with the c-bias being a strong predictor of the future direction of the MPR. This strong predictive ability is a necessary condition for the c-bias to have an impact on macroeconomic variables.
One additional comment deserves mentioning. The c-bias does not seem to be an outstanding forecast of future developments in the MPR in the very short run. This is so because the c-bias is only able to outperform one of the six models used in the forecasting exercise when prediction is evaluated one month ahead. Moreover, the only case in which the c-bias is outperformed occurs at this specific horizon. The c-bias displays a much better predictive performance at longer horizons. In particular, when predicting five or more months ahead, the c-bias outperforms at least four of the six benchmarks.
unexpected MPR changes separately, where the expected MPR (ΔMPR t e ) is defined as This appendix thus assesses whether market operators change their perception of the future based on the information in the c-bias. We use the following specification:
where we regress changes in the forward rates with the different components of the communicational bias and with the unexpected and expected components of MPR changes. We consider twelve regressions: one for each forward rate, from i = 1 to i = 12. The results are displayed in table A1.
Both the expected and unexpected changes in the MPR have a statistically significant impact on the very short end of the forward curve. This impact is positive and not negligible. The impact of the unexpected component is stronger than that of the expected component. Table A1 further shows that the c-bias also affects forward rates in the very short term, with a statistically significant impact on the first three forward rates. Two particular results deserve mentioning. First, our regressions suggest that a neutral bias has an impact on the short end of the forward curve, which is a little surprising. Second, the sign of the coefficients associated with the c-bias variables are generally not as expected. For example, an upward bias seems to have a negative impact on the forward curve, which is somewhat counterintuitive.
A number of factors could explain these puzzling results regarding the impact of the c-bias on the forward curve. Rigobón and Sack describe the traditional limitations of event-study approaches.
2 Additional constraints include the small sample size (only seventy-seven observations for regressions in table A1) and the fact that financial markets are not as liquid as an econometrician would wish. Finally, the definition of a c-bias surprise is not clear-cut, so the correct identification of the unexpected component of the c-bias may help clarify our findings. Since this is not the main focus of this article, we leave the interesting task of thoroughly evaluating the c-bias's impact on macroeconomic outcomes to future research. 
We are not really interested in using the testing function h t = 1. When using the relevant testing function, the null hypothesis in equation (21) is different. We notice that which is simply the probability of making a mistaken forecast when the c-bias is not neutral. Let us consider the following set, C:
Then, and thus
We calculate the following probability: , 
Comment
Oscar Landerretche: One of my favorite ways to think about the Central Bank is probably one of the most insulting to the profound solemnity of central bankers: namely, as a communications and propaganda agency. I once knew a central banker who frequently repeated the following joke about monetary reincarnation: "When a central banker is good in life, he is reincarnated as a physicist; when he is bad, he is reincarnated as a sociologist." Modern central banking, especially in inflation-targeting regimes, relies enormously on communications policy to stabilize the demand. So, unfortunately for my friend, good modern central bankers are very talented at social perceptions and outright propaganda. If they are good in life, maybe they will be reincarnated as marketing majors. One of the nicest things about how this works is that it happens in different ways around the world, and the way it functions depends greatly on market and institutional traditions that are specific to each particular country and money market. This contributes an enormous amount of color and heterogeneity to the central banking world, which is crucial to know for practitioners and interesting for macroeconomic connoisseurs.
Pablo Pincheira and Mauricio Calani explore how this mechanism works in Chile considering a specific aspect of the communications policy of the Central Bank: the minutes. Their study advances toward one of the most fundamental facts about contemporary Chilean monetary policy: that the actual movement of interest rates is, at times, much less interesting than the signaling game that precedes it. If what Pincheira and Calani say is true, a big part of the monetary policy communications game is run long before interest rates are raised or lowered by any amount of basis points. This is thus one of the first papers that actually attempts to study the Central Bank of Chile as a communications agency.
There are very good reasons for expecting the communications policy of central banks to have become much more active in recent years. Consider a classical rationale for a central banker who wishes to signal certain policy commitments to a Bayesian audience. The audience will update its priors on the central banker based on the signals it receives. Given the nature of contemporary communications and online chatter, however, small pieces of information that in the past only affected parts of the market or took a substantial amount of time to spread may have a greater (or quicker) effect than before. In a Bayesian sense, this could mean that monetary signals have become more noisy. If so, central banks will probably be increasingly active in communications and policy signals, trying to reduce to noise in order to preserve their credibility and communications influence. Figure 2 in the paper is very suggestive of an increase in communications activity by the Central Bank of Chile through increased variability of its bias. This paper does not attempt to demonstrate that this phenomenon is happening; it does not try to prove that the minutes are an optimal or particularly efficient communications mechanism or that this particular mechanism is preferable to others. More crucially, it does not argue that the market actually uses the communication bias in the minutes, just that it should. What it does argue is that the minutes contain information that the market cannot replicate with a simple measure of the Central Bank's reaction function and standard market models.
The crucial thing about the paper is that the information content of the communication bias is measured through a perceptions survey of Central Bank board members and executives. This is thus, at the very least, a measure of the communication intentions of the Central Bank. The paper argues that these intentions, as expressed in the bias of the minutes, contain information that should be valuable to the market. If one takes the results presented by the authors as a whole, it seems that market forecasters still improve on the communications bias in their short-term second-guessing of the Central Bank, but not in their forecasting of medium-term monetary policies and stance, so some information is not being used. If the argument is taken in this way, this is a very useful paper for both the market and the Central Bank.
On the other hand, the results of the paper, taken at face value, do not necessarily mean that market forecasters for Chilean monetary policy are getting it wrong. Another way of reading the paper's results is that because the interpretation of the bias used in the paper comes from the policymakers and not from the market, the discrepancy in the forecasts may indicate that the Central Bank is not actually communicating what it wants to the market. It is very difficult to believe that market forecasters do not read the minutes, so, what is missing? The answer is very simple: exegesis-that is, official annotated
